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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
> • 
Plaintiff-Respondent, > 
) 
-v- > Case No. 14004 
> 
GUS WILLIAM SIMPSON, ) 
> 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case wherein the appellant appeals from a 
conviction of illegal possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter came before the Honorable Edward Sheya, Judge 
of the District Court for San Juan County, sitting without a jury, on the 
3rd and 4th days of December, 1974. The court took this matter under 
advisement for approximately one month; then, on the 15th day of January, 
1975, the appellant was found guilty of illegal possession of a controlled 
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substance with intent to distribute for value. On the 19th day of February, 
1975, the appellant was sentenced for not more than five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction because (1) the 
marijuana seized by the state police officers was the product of an illegal 
search and seizure; (2) the appellant was interrogated while in custody 
without being informed of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution; and (3) the Utah courts lack jurisdiction 
to convict the appellant of the crime for which he was charged and convicted. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about the 15th day of May, 1974, the appellant was piloting 
a small single-engine aircraft from Mexico to Idaho (R. 79, 117, 123). 
Needing fuel to reach his destination in Idaho, he landed the aircraft at the 
Blanding airstrip at approximately 2:30 a .m. (R. 8, 123). Finding no one 
present to help him refuel the plane, the appellant taxied it to the end of the 
airstrip to wait until daylight (R. 10, 129, 130). After observing the 
appellant's conduct at the airstrip, the airport manager called the police 
because he was suspicious that the appellant wanted to rob something from 
the other planes tied down at the airstrip (R. 11). Three policemen arrived 
at the airport to investigate (Rc 12). While two of them approached the 
aircraft by driving a police car along the runway with the headlights off, the 
third officer on foot circled behind the aircraft and approached it from an 
-2-
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opposite direction (Re 13, 72) 0 The three officers reached the aircraft 
simultaneously (R. 39). The officers in the police car turned on their 
headlights and shined a spotlight on the plane while the third officer 
closed in on foot with a gun in his hand (R. 39, 132). The appellant knew 
he was surrounded by police and felt that if he had moved, they would 
have shot him (R. 133). One of the policemen arriving in the police car 
located the appellant some thirty feet from the plane (R. 40, 63) and 
asked him for some identification (R. 42, 146) while the officer behind 
the appellant asked him about the contents of the airplane (R. 147). The 
appellant responded that the plane was "loaded with pot" (Rc 52, 149). 
The police officers then placed the appellant under arrest (Rc 52), read 
him the Miranda warning (Rc 53), searched his person (R. 54), hand-
cuffed him, and placed him in the patrol car (R. 55)
 0 One officer then 
radioed to Monticello for more assistance (R. 55, 67). Some minutes 
later, two more officers arrived (R
 0 68) . Traveling from Monticello to 
the Blanding airport, the two officers passed by the offices of two 
justices of the peace (R. 67, 116). Yet, they failed to obtain a search 
warrant (R« 68). 
The policemen approached the plane, smelled an odor which 
they believed to be marijuana, and observed a number of packages 
wrapped in plastic located in the interior of the plane (R. 56). They 
searched the plane, took photographs (R. 68, 69), and removed the 
packages (R. 80, 102). All this was done without a search warrant (R. 68). 
»3-
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The packages were found to contain marijuana (R. 92). 
On the 15th day of January, 1975, the Honorable Edward Sheya, 
Judge for the District Court of San Juan County, Utah, sitting without a jury, 
found the appellant guilty of illegal possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute for value in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1973) (R. 159). On the 19th day of February, 
1975, the appellant was sentenced to not more than five years in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 186). 
In finding the appellant guilty, the lower court determined that 
the appellant's statement that the plane was 'loaded with potM was admissible 
as evidence regardless of the fact that when the statement was made the 
appellant was surrounded by police officers, that one of the officers had a 
gun in his hand, and that at this time no Miranda warning had been given 
(R. 52). The lower court further found the appellant guilty of an intent to 
distribute a controlled substance despite the appellant's contention that he 
intended to distribute it only in Idaho (R. 161). Finally, the court allowed 
a large quantity of marijuana to be admitted as evidence against the appellant 
even though it had been obtained by a search and seizure conducted without 
a search warrant (R. 172). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE AIRPLANE OF 
WHICH THE APPELLANT WAS THE PILOT IS INADMIS-
SIBLE AS THE PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH 
eVv1--''. -4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AND SEIZURE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SEARCH 
WARRANT AND BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT 
MUST BE OBTAINED INCIDENT TO ARREST UNLESS 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUCH AS TO 
JUSTIFY A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT FIRST 
OBTAINING A SEARCH WARRANT. 
In order to afford the appellant's uniform constitutional safe-
guards under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that standards and criteria set 
forth in the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court are binding 
upon state courts. This rule is set forth in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 
23 (1963). All eight members participating in the decision of this Court 
agreed that they would review the California case to determine whether 
the "constitutional criteria established by this Court have been respected" 
with regard to search and seizure procedures (374 U.S» at 34). 
On numerous occasions the United States Supreme Court has 
stated the general requirement that searches and seizures are to be made 
only with a search warrant, unless an emergency situation arises which 
would justify a search and seizure without a warranto The Court in 
McDonald v. United States, 355 U.S. 451 at 455, 456 (1948) stated: 
We are not dealing with formalities« The 
presence of a search warrant serves a high 
function. Absent some grave emergency, the 
Fourth Amendment has interposed a magis-
trate between the citizen and the police. . . . 
We cannot be true to that constitutional 
requirement and excuse the absence of a 
search warrant without showing by those who 
seek exemption from the constitutional man-
date that the exigencies of the situation made 
that course imperative,, (Emphasis added0) 
-5-
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In the instant case, the challenged search and seizure was made without 
a search warranto Therefore, according to McE)onald, supra, the respon-
dent had the burden of proving that there was a "grave emergency" situation 
justifying the absence of a warrant. 
The Supreme Court in Chimel vc California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), 
held that there are two grave emergency situations, i.e<>, "exigent circum-
stances, ff whereby a police officer may search a person he has just arrested 
and the area within the arrestee1 s immediate control without a search 
warrant: 
(1) Where the police officer is searching to 
remove any weapons in order to protect 
himself and prevent the suspect's escape; 
(2) Where the police officer is searching for 
incriminating evidence in order to prevent 
its concealment or destruction. 
The Supreme Court in Chimel, supra, found that the search of the defendant's 
home and cars after he had been arrested on the doorstep of his home was 
unconstitutional. In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court said: 
The search here went far beyond the petitioner's 
person and the area from within which he might 
have obtained either a weapon or something that 
could have been used as evidence. There is no 
constitutional justification, in the absence of a 
search warrant, for extending the search beyond 
thatarea. 395 U.S0 at 768. 
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explicitly 
followed Chimel, supra. In United States v, Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 
1969), a post-Chimel decision, the defendant had been arrested for parole 
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violation at his home. At the time of his arrest the officers observed 
some drug paraphernalia and proceeded to search the premises without 
a search warrant. Heroin was seized during the warrantless search. 
The Tenth Circuit in holding that the search and seizure of the heroin 
was unlawful said: 
The area within the immediate control 
of the defendant may be searched and 
evidence or weapons seized without a 
warrant when made incident to a lawful 
arrest . . . . Moreover, it cannot be 
said that the night stand, under the bed 
or any similar area was under any type 
of control by Baca inasmuch as he was 
handcuffed with his hands behind his 
back and was unable to even dress him-
self. 417 F.2d at 105. 
The court went further to say: 
The rule has been long established that 
whenever practicable an officer must 
secure a search warrant. .
 0 . It is 
difficult to understand how or why it was 
not practicable for one of the five officers 
to obtain a search warrant based on 
probable cause resulting from the finding 
of the two vials and narcotics parapher-
nalia. 417 Fo2d at 105-106. 
In the instant case, testimony by the appellant and police 
officers indicated that the appellant was some twenty to thirty feet away 
from the airplane when the arrest was made (R. 63). The police then 
reasonably searched the appellant for any weapons in order to protect 
themselves (R. 54). This search of the person of the appellant was justi-
fied by both Chimel and Baca, supra. However, after the police 
-7-
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handcuffed the appellant and placed him in the police car (R. 55), there 
was no further justification under the rationale of Chimel and Baca, supra, 
to search the airplane which was out of the immediate control of the appel-
lant (R. 90, 103). After the police searched the appellant1 s person in order 
to protect themselves, no further exigent circumstances existed. In search-
ing the airplane, the police were in no way attempting to protect themselves 
or to prevent the appellant's escape. Furthermore, there could have been 
no apprehension on their part that the evidence in the airplane would be 
destroyed or concealed because, as in Baca, supra, where the arrestee was 
handcuffed and in custody, the appellant in the instant case was likewise 
handcuffed and placed in the police car . According to Chimel and Baca, 
supra, a search warrant is absolutely mandatory for a search extending 
beyond the area within the appellant's immediate control. 
Evidence from the trial further indicated that before the airplane 
was searched, the arresting officer telephoned Sheriff Wright in Monticello 
to assist in the search of the airplane (R. 87). The contents of the airplane 
were not seized until after Sheriff Wright arrived at the Blanding airport 
(R. 90). Sheriff Wright testified that there were two justices of the peace 
in Blanding, a mere four miles from the Blanding airport (R. 67, 116). In 
other words, the appellant was handcuffed and in custody of three policemen 
while Sheriff Wright was traveling from Monticello to the Blanding airport 
and passing right by the offices of two magistrates authorized to issue search 
warrants. Yet, neither Sheriff Wright nor any of the policemen obtained a 
- Q -
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search warrant which would have been practicable and convenient under 
the circumstances. Similar circumstances existed in Baca, supra, 
wherein the court stated: 
It is difficult to understand how or why 
it was not practicable for one of the 
five officers to obtain a search warrant 
based on probable cause . . . . 417 
Fo2d at 105 -106. 
In the instant case it was not only practicable as required by Baca, supra, 
but also convenient for the officers to obtain a search warrant before 
searching the airplane which was some thirty feet from the appellant who 
was handcuffed and in custody
 0 The failure of the officers to obtain the 
mandatory search warrant was a direct violation of the appellant's Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Chimel and Baca, supra, dealt with the legality of a "premise 
search"; however, it is clear that the same limitations apply to "vehicle 
searchescu In United States v. Mclntyre, 304 F . Supp. 1244 (E.D. La. 
1969), a post-Chimel case, the defendants were arrested twenty feet from 
their automobile, but the police searched the vehicle anyway without a 
search warrant. The Court upheld the motion to suppress by holding: 
[T]he situation did not demand immediate 
seizure of whatever was inside their 
vehicle. Defendants, apparently unarmed 
and standing twenty feei away, could not 
have reached objects in rhe car, either to 
threaten the policemen or to destroy evi-
dence . With three officers and two police 
cars available to guard the car and the 
- 9 -
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suspects, there was no excuse for failing 
to obtain a warrant before searching the 
automobile, 304 F0 Supp, at 1246. 
(Emphasis added o) 
Since the limitation of Chimel, supra, has been applied to auto-
mobile searches, there is no reason not to apply it to airplane searches
 0 
In the instant case where the appellant was arrested thirty feet away from 
the airplane, handcuffed, and placed in the custody of three policemen, 
there was no excuse for failing to obtain a search warrant before searching 
the airplane
 0 
The Supreme Court in Coolidge vc New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 
(1971), stated that simply because contraband is in plain view incident to a 
lawful arrest, the contraband cannot be seized without a search warrant 
absent exigent circumstances, regardless of the fullest amount of probable 
cause, Coolidge, supra, stands for the proposition that a seizure of contra-
band in plain view where no search is necessary is subject to constitutional 
limitations: 
The limits on the doctrine [plain view] are 
implicit in the statement of its rationale. 
The first of these is that plain view alone is 
never enough to justify the warrantless 
seizure of evidence. This is simply a 
corollary of the familiar principle discussed 
above, that no amount of probable cause can 
justify a warrantless search or seizure absent 
'exigent circumstance's"? incontrovertible 
testimony of the senses that an incriminating 
object is on premises belonging to a criminal 
suspect may establish the fullest possible 
measure of probable cause. But even where 
the object is contraband, this Court has 
-10-
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repeatedly stated and enforced the basic 
rule that the police may not enter and 
make a warrantless seizure. 403 U.S. 
at 468. (Emphasis added.) 
The facts of the instant case indicate that the police could see 
plastic bags in the airplane by looking through the windows and could also 
smell the presence of marijuana (R. 88). Thus, they had probable cause 
to believe that the airplane carried contraband because of the 'Incontro-
vertible testimony of their senses." Yet, the Court in Coolidge, supra, 
stated that even with indisputable probable cause, the police could not 
seize contraband in plain view unless exigent circumstances existed. 
Because exigent circumstances did not exist, in that there was no possi-
bility that the evidence would be destroyed, the seizure of the marijuana 
without a search warrant was illegal and the marijuana should not be 
admissible as evidence against the appellant. 
While Coolidge, supra, involved a seizure of automobiles in 
plain view, that case has also been applied to evidence in plain view within 
' an automobile. It is therefore reasonable to apply the Coolidge limitations 
to contraband in plain view in airplanes. In a recent Montana case, 
State v. Amor, 520 P02d 773 (Mont. S. Ct. 1974), the police looked 
through the windows of a parolee's parked car and saw what appeared to 
be a box of rifle ammunition on the seat. Knowing that parolees were not 
permitted to possess weapons, the police seized the box of ammunition 
and further searched the vehicle without a search warrant. The Supreme 
-11-
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Court of Montana, in affirming the defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence, stated: 
In the instant case the presence of the 
ammunition box in the automobile and 
knowledge that Amor, the registered owner, 
was a parolee who matched the general 
description of the burglar were facts con-
tributing to the existence of probable cause, 
not exigent circumstances
 0 . . . In the 
instant case we find that it was both p r a c -
ticable and mandatory that the officers 
obtain a valid warrant before conducting 
a search of Amor's parked, unoccupied 
automobile. 520 Pc2d at 775. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The instant case is similar to Amor, supra, because in both 
factual situations probable cause had been established. And Amor, supra, 
held that existence of probable cause did not permit the officers to seize 
evidence in plain view inside a vehicle without a search warran t . It must 
be remembered that plain view alone is not an exigent circumstance. 
Rather, exigent circumstances exist only when the officers are trying to 
protect themselves o r prevent the destruction of evidence (Chimel, supra) . 
In the instant case there were no exigent circumstances when the officers 
seized the marijuana which was in plain view in the airplane. The officers 
relied on the plain view doctrine alone to justify their warrantless search 
and seizure which was illegal according to the standards of Chimel, Coolidge, 
and Amor, supra. 
In the instant case the tr ial court justified the seizure of the 
marijuana from the airplane by relying on three Utah cases dealing with 
- 1 2 -
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search and seizure (R. 162, 163, 164): State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 
395 P.2d 535 (1964); State v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503.P.2d 848 (1972); 
and State v0 Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651 (1972). 
Of course, Allred, supra, is no support for the trial court's 
position in the instant case because Allred, supra, was decided prior to 
and overruled by both Chimel and Coolidge, supra. 
Neither is Shields, supra, support for the trial court's position 
in the instant case because there were exigent circumstances present in 
Shields, supra, as required by Chimel and Coolidge, supra, which justified 
the warrantless search of an automobile which was stopped on the highway. 
In Shields, supra, this court held: 
[A] search warrant is unnecessary where 
there is probable cause to search an 
automobile stopped on the highway, for 
the car is movable, the occupants alerted, 
and the car 's contents may never be 
found a in if a w aidant us*: be obtained. 
503 P.2c at 849c (Emph^is added.) 
Even though this court used the phrase "probable cause" and not the phrase 
"exigent circumstances" in Shields, supra, this court still found exigent 
circumstances to exist because it found that alerted occupants could have 
moved the car and its contents before a warrant could have been obtained. 
No such exigent circumstances existed in the instant case because the 
appellant was the sole occupant of the airplane. He was handcuffed and in 
custody
 0 Surely he posed no threat that the airplane and its contents would 
be moved or destroyed. 
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Martinez, supra, the remaining case cited in support of the trial 
court's position in the instant case, was decided after Coolidge, supra, 
which held that a warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view where no 
search was necessary may only be valid with the presence of exigent c i r -
 x 
cumstances. The scant record of Martinez, supra, (less than one page) does 
not indicate whether exigent circumstances existed
 e Nor did this court cite 
therein any cases whatsoever to justify its bare holding that seizure of 
evidence in plain view in an automobile was lawful. 
If indeed no exigent circumstances existed in Martinez, supra, 
this court's holding therein is clearly contrary to the federal standards in 
Coolidge, supra. And Ker, supra, holds that federal standards must be 
applied to state cases. 
In both Amor (Montana) and Martinez (Utah), supra, the incrimi-
nating evidence was seen in plain view through the window of an unoccupied 
parked automobile and was seized without a search warrant. In Amor, supra, 
the Montana Supreme Court following Ker, supra, specifically cited Coolidge, 
supra, in holding that if exigent circumstances did not exist there could be 
no lawful seizure of evidence even though it was in plain view. 
A search and seizure of evidence in plain view incident to a lawful 
arrest is valid only when circumstances are such that the police are trying 
to protect themselves, trying to prevent escape, or trying to prevent the 
concealment or destruction of incriminating evidence. Chimel, supra0 
These are the only exigent circumstances which justify a seizure of evidence 
- i d . -
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in plain view without a search warrant. Contraband in plain view estab-
lishes probable cause for arrest but does not alone justify a warrantless 
seizure of the contraband. Exigent circumstances must also exist. 
Coolidge, supra. No exigent circumstances existed in the instant case 
at the time of the search or seizure; i . e . , the officers were not attempt-
ing to protect themselves; the officers were not attempting to prevent the 
escape of the appellant; the officers were not attempting to prevent the 
airplane from being moved; nor were the officers attempting to prevent 
the destruction of the marijuana. Therefore, the seizure of the marijuana 
in the instant case was unreasonable and unlawful; the marijuana should 
not have been admitted into evidence at the trial; and the appellant's con-
viction and sentence should be reversed by this court. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS AS DEFINED BY MIRANDA v. ARIZONA 
BECAUSE HE WAS INTERROGATED WHILE IN 
CUSTODY WITHOUT HAVING BEEN INFORMED OF 
HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
Under the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
appellant is entitled by the Fifth Amendment, when in custody and prior 
to any interrogation, to be informed of his "right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and 
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed." 384 U.S. at 444. The evidence clearly reveals that at the 
time appellant made the statement that the airplane was "full of pot" (R. 52) 
-IS-
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I 
no Miranda warning had been given to him by any officer
 0 
The sole significant issue pertaining to the Miranda warning as • 
applied to the instant case is whether there was custodial interrogation. I 
In deciding Miranda, supra, the Supreme Court was explicit in its definition 
of the term "custodial interrogation by stating: " 
By custodial interrogation we mean questioning I 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a • 
person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any signi- I 
ficantway. 384 U.S« at 444, * 
In the instant case the appellant was surrounded by three law enforcement I 
officers at gun point (R
 0 39, 132). The appellant knew he was surrounded . 
by police and felt that if he had moved, they would have shot him (Rc 133) • 
The appellant was indeed in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom I 
of action in a significant way as required by Miranda, supra, after which • 
one law enforcement officer asked the appellant for some identification 
(R. 42, 146), and another law enforcement officer asked, "What is in the | 
airplane?" (R. 147). The appellant responded that the airplane was "loaded i 
with pot" (R. 52, 149). No Miranda warning had yet been given the appel-
lant by the law enforcement officers. The appellant was in custody before | 
the questioning was initiated by the law enforcement officers. | 
- Courts interpreting Miranda, supra, have repeatedly stressed 
j 
that the emphasis is upon the person's reasonable belief as to whether he ! 
was free to leave. In People v. Ellingsen, 65 Cah Rptr. 744 (1968), a . ; 
16 year old boy was taken to the police station for questioning with regard 
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to the murder of his s i s t e r . The prosecutor la ter tried to use the boy's 
statements as evidence at his murder trial
 0 The issue was whether the 
boy was in custody. The California Court of Appeals, deciding that he 
was, stated: 
For a person to be regarded as being 
fin custody1 for purposes of giving 
required warnings under the Miranda 
decision, it is not necessary that he be 
under a r res t and custody occurs if the 
suspect is physically deprived of freedom 
in any significant way or is led to believe, 
as a reasonable person, that he is so 
deprived o 65 Cal. Rptr« at 744. 
At the time the incriminating statement was made by the 
appellant in the instant case, the appellant reasonably believed that his 
freedom of action was significantly impaired (R. 133, 135) within the 
meaning of Ellingsen, supra. 
Therefore, the appellant1 s Fifth Amendment rights have been 
violated, his incriminating statement should not have been admitted in 
evidence at the trial , and his conviction and sentence by the lower court 
should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH LACKED JURIS-
DICTION TO PUNISH THE APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE BECAUSE HE 
INTENDED TO DISTRIBUTE THE CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE ONLY IN IDAHO. 
To convict appellant for illegal possession of a controlled 
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substance with intent to distribute for value under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii) (Suppc 1973), the respondent must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the appellant had an intent to distribute a controlled 
substance in Utah. The tr ial court found that the appellant was transporting 
marijuana to Idaho and merely stopped in Blanding, Utah, to refuel his 
airplane (R. 160) „ The intent to distribute pertained only to Idaho, and the 
record is clear that appellant had no intent to distribute marijuana in UtahG 
There can be no presumption that the appellant intended to d i s -
tribute in Utah merely because he was in possession of a large quantity of 
marijuana within Utah. While Utah courts are silent on this point, recent 
case law of other jurisdictions concludes that intent to distribute cannot be 
presumed from mere possession. In State v . O'Meally, 95 Idaho 202, 506 
P.2d 99 (1973), the defendant was charged with possession with intent to 
deliver 38 tablets of amphetamine sulphate, .061 grams of cocaine hydro-
chloride, and 62023 grams of marijuana. In affirming the dismissal of the 
complaint, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that an intent to deliver a con-
trolled substance could not be inferred from mere possession. In a similar 
case, Redden v. State, 281 A.2d 490 (Delc Supr. 1971), the defendant was 
convicted of possession with intent to sell 12 ounces and 29 sealed envelopes 
of marijuana c In reversing his conviction, the Delaware Supreme Court 
stated: 
It was, of course, incumbent upon the 
state to prove the element of intent to 
sell, as well as other elements of the 
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offense by competent evidence sufficient 
to justify submission of the issue to the 
jury. . . . We hold, therefore, that 
there was not sufficient evidence of 
intent to sell in this case to warrant 
submission of the case to the jury. 
281 A.2d at 491. 
In State v0 Fitzpatrick, 491 Pc2d 262 (Wash. App. 1972), a 
very similar fact situation to the instant case was presented. The defen-
dant was convicted of possession with intent to sell after having trans-
ported 76 bricks of marijuana by plane across the Canadian border in 
Washington. A Washington statute provided for a presumption of intent 
to sell from the fact of possession of more than 40 grams of marijuana. 
Yet the court, reversing the defendant's conviction, stated: 
The trier of fact need give such a pre-
sumption only such weight as it seems to 
merit. . . . Where a defendant's acts 
are patently equivocal, a criminal intent to 
sell the marijuana cannot be inferred from 
the overt act of possession of that amount 
atone. 491 P.2d at 266-267. 
The Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Annotated 
§ 57-37-8, under which appellant was convicted, includes no statutory 
presumption of intent to sell from the fact of mere possession. Further-
more, QTMeally, Redden, and Fitzpatrick, supra, indicate that the 
respondent cannot make such a presumption. In the instant case, abso-
lutely no evidence whatsoever was offered by the respondent of the 
appellant's intent to distribute in Utah. Simply because appellant was 
in possession of a large quantity of marijuana within Utah boundaries 
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does not mean that he intended to distribute marijuana within Utahu 
The lower court found that Utah had jurisdiction to punish the 
appellant for intent to deliver a controlled substance in Utah, even though 
he intended to transport the marijuana only to Idaho (R. 160)
 0 The lower 
court relied in pertinent part upon Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-201 (2), 
which states that a person is subject to prosecution in this state if the 
offense is committed wholly or partially within this state. Utah Code Anno-
tated § 76-1-201 (2) further provides: 
(2) An offense is committed partly within 
this state if either the conduct which 
is an element of the offense, or the 
result which is such an element, occurs 
within this state. 
Despite this statute, Utah lacks jurisdiction to punish the appel-
lant for an intent to distribute outside Utah's borders because the appellant's 
conduct nor its result was an element of the offense to distribute in Idaho. 
California has a statute almost identical to Utah's jurisdictional statute0 
Subdivision (1) of Section 27 of the California Penal Code provides that 
persons may be punished "under the laws of this state" if they "commit, in 
whole or in part, any crime within this state." Section 778(a) of that code 
further provides: 
Whenever a person, with intent to commit r 
a crime, does any act within this state in 
execution or part execution of such intent, 
which culminates in the commission of a 
crime, either within or without this state, 
such person is punishable for such crime 
in this state in the same manner as if the 
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same had been committed entirely within 
this state. 
The case of People v, Buffum, 256 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1953), 
interprets the California statute and indicates when a state may punish 
a person when that person intends to commit a crime outside the bound-
aries of that state. In Buffum, supra, the defendants were doctors who 
were residents of California. They performed abortions on several 
women in Mexico. The trial court convicted defendants of conspiracy to 
use certain means to induce miscarriages. Yet, the defendants did not 
intend to commit abortions in California, only in Mexico
 0 In reversing 
their convictions, the California Supreme Court stated: 
To read such a statute as authorizing 
punishment by one state of acts which 
do not amount to an attempt but are 
merely preparatory to the commission 
of a crime in another state would seem 
tantamount to an effort to regulate con-
duct in the other jurisdiction. 256 P.2d 
at 320. 
The California court further held that before it could have jurisdiction 
over an individual intending to commit a crime beyond its borders, the 
acts of the defendant must have constituted at least an attempt to commit 
the offense
 0 An intent to commit a crime outside the boundaries of 
California did not give the California court jurisdiction. 
The appellant in the instant case did not attempt or even intend 
to distribute marijuana within Utah. Therefore, according to Buffum, 
supra, a case dealing with California statutes similar to those Utah 
_oi _ 
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statutes under which the lower court claimed jurisdiction over the appellant, 
Utah courts should not have jurisdiction over a crime intended to take place 
outside Utah. 
A case similar to Buffum, supra, is People v. Werblow, 241 NoY. 
55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925). The court in that case dealt with a New York 
statute which gave New York courts jurisdiction of 1fa person who commits 
within the state any crime, in whole or in part ." 148 N.E. at 788. The 
New York court in reversing the conviction of defendant who conspired to 
commit grand larceny outside the boundaries of New York stated: 
We think a crime is not committed either 
wholly or partly in this state, unless the act 
within this state is so related to the crime 
that if nothing more had followed, it would 
amount to an attempt. 148 N.E. at 789. 
It is clear that the appellant in the instant case did nothing which 
would amount to an attempt to distribute a controlled substance in Utah. 
According to Buffum and Werblow, supra, in order for a state to have jur is-
diction over a person intending to commit a crime outside the boundaries 
of that state, the person must have performed an act within the state 
amounting to an attempt to commit the crime for which he is charged
 0 
The appellant in the instant case is charged with intent to distribute a con-
trolled substance in Utahc Utah has claimed jurisdiction, notwithstanding 
the fact that the appellant intended to distribute outside Utah and in no way 
attempted to distribute in Utah. In light of the fact that Buffum and Werblow, 
supra, hold that an intent alone to commit a crime outside the borders of a 
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state does not give that state jurisdiction, the conviction of the appellant 
for intent to distribute a controlled substance must be reversed for lack 
of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was denied his Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable search and seizure. 
The appellant was denied his Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination. 
The appellant was denied his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights against due process and equal protection of the law because of the 
lower court's lack of jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the appellant's conviction and sentence by the lower 
court should be reversed. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN 
90 West Firth North 
Price, Utah 84501 
PHIL L . HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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